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SUBVERTING GOOD INTENTIONS: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF MENTAL HEATH LAW "REFORM"
Rael Jean Isaac' and Samuel Jan Brakel'
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 1981, Darrell Burch wandered along a
Florida highway, bruised, bloodied, and disoriented.1 A good
Samaritan took him to a private mental health center in Tallahassee, where he was evaluated by the medical staff. They
reported that Burch was hallucinating and confused - he said
he was in heaven - and concluded that he was psychotic.
Burch signed voluntary admission and consent-to-treatment
papers. After performing a more intensive evaluation, the
medical staff found him to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and in need of longer-term treatment.
On December 10, the Tallahassee center staff therefore
referred Burch to Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee
which admitted him that day after he had signed forms (similar
to those that he had signed at the Tallahassee center) requesting admission and authorizing treatment. Consent to treatment
for schizophrenia in modern psychiatric practice means consent
to treatment with anti-psychotic drugs, which were accordingly
used to treat Burch. Hospital records indicate Burch persisted
for some time in his belief that he was "elsewhere" and that he
was often uncooperative and resistant to ministrations of the
staff. He nonetheless signed another authorization-of-treatment
form two weeks after his admission, and returned voluntarily
from the two weekend furloughs with his family that he re-

I B.A. Barnard College, 1954; M.A. Johns Hopkins, 1956; Ph.D. City
University of New York, 1972. Mrs. Isaac's most recent book is Madness in
the Streets: How Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally Ill, coauthored with Virginia C. Armat.
tt A.B. Davidson College, 1965; J.D. University of Chicago, 1968. Member
of the teaching faculty at DePaul University College of Law, Director of Research at the College's Health Law Institute, and on the staff of the Isaac Ray
Center in Chicago.
' Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118-121 (1990). Except where noted
otherwise, the authors have used the description of the events surrounding
Burch's admission from the Court's statement of the facts of the case.
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ceived during the course of his stay.2 Burch remained at the
hospital until his release five months after his admission.
Thus far the story of Darrell Burch is commonplace, repeated with minor variations many thousands of times each
year.' Nothing in these events suggested that Burch's experiences would become the basis for a Supreme Court decision that
would undercut the whole concept of voluntary admission and
threaten much of the progress achieved through consensual
treatment of mental illness. Of the "reforms" of mental health
law in the 1960s - of which the hordes of homeless mentally ill
are the most visible legacy4 - encouraging mentally ill persons
to accept treatment voluntarily had been one of the few to work
out as intended. In 1960, the overwhelming majority of mental
patients in the United States were involuntarily committed to

2

Telephone Interview with Walter Meginnis, Florida State Attorney

General's Office (June 6, 1991).
' See admission statistics cited in text infra.
'There is broad agreement among experts that the percentage of seriously
mentally ill among the homeless population is between 33-40%. The number

of homeless is a more contentious issue, with the 1990 U.S. census figures of
230,000 homeless (at a given moment in time) severely attacked by advocates
for the homeless as far too low. A 1984 survey by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development estimated between 250,000 and 350,000
homeless. The Urban Institute in 1987, in a study financed by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, estimated there were 600,000 homeless. Actually,
the estimate seems to have been influenced by fears that the actual numbers
were too low to be politically correct. One of the study's authors, Martha Burt,
called the 600,000 figure deliberately high "based on our desire to err on the
side - as a government study - of overestimating rather than underestimating." See RAEL JEAN ISAAC AND VIRGINIA ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREET,
3-4 (1990). The numbers of mentally ill homeless are rising. In 1991, on the
basis of a 21 city survey, the Conference of Mayors reported that their number
had grown by 7% since 1990. In 1991, in these 21 cities, there were 69,000
people both homeless and seriously mentally ill. See Rael Jean Isaac, A
DetourAround Crazy Mental Health Laws, WALL ST. J., April 16, 1992.
The link between the rising numbers of homeless mentally ill persons
and changes in the mental health law can also be inferred from individual
case studies. See Alexander Brooks, Law and Ideology in the Case of Billie
Boggs, 26 J. PsYCHOSocIAL NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. 22 (1988).
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state hospitals.5 Today, 73% of the 1.6 million annual admissions (including to private hospitals) are voluntary patients.6
Unlike countless otherwise similar patients, Burch did not
slip quietly back into the community. Shortly after his release,
Burch filed a complaint, stating that he had been inappropriately admitted and did not remember signing any admission or
treatment forms. The complaint reached the Florida Human
Rights Advocacy Committee, an entity within the State's Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services, which investigated and wrote a letter to Burch encouraging him to proceed
with his grievance.'
While he initially filed a legal action on his own behalf,
Burch realized his chances of success were not good. He therefore elicited the help of a private attorney,' and in February of
1985 - almost three years after the events - Burch and his
attorney brought a formal section 1983 law suit in federal
district court against the treatment and admission staff at both
the Tallahassee Mental Health Center and Florida State Hospital.9
Burch alleged in his complaint that the defendants had
violated his constitutional rights when they admitted and
'In Congressional hearings in 1961 and 1963 on the rights of the mentally
ill, witnesses testified that only between 10-20% of admissions to public and
private mental hospitals were voluntary. In public hospitals the rates were
very low, with some hospitals only accepting involuntarily committed patients.
In the 1961 hearings Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeths
Hospital in Washington D.C., testified that only 265 of the 7,000 patients in
that hospital were voluntary. ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill, 1961:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 36,47 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 Hearings]. To Protectthe ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill, 1963: Hearings
on S.935 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Hearings].
6 Paul Appelbaum, Voluntary Hospitalization and Due Process: The
Dilemma of Zinermon v. Burch, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1059,
1060 (1990).
' Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 840 F.2d 797, 799
(11th Cir. 1988).
8 Telephone Interview with Richard Powers, Burch's Attorney (June 14,
1991).
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). In its initial stages, Burch's suit also sought
recovery from the county sheriff, who had transported him from the community center to the state hospital. Burch dropped this part of the suit early in the
proceedings. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 804 F.2d
1549, 1551 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986).
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treated him as a voluntary patient in the face of evidence that
his mental condition made him incapable of giving voluntary
consent. The central portions of the complaint, drafted in
typical heavy-handed legal style, put it this way:
Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have
known that Plaintiff was incapable of voluntary, knowing, understanding and informed consent to admission
and treatment at FSH [Florida State Hospital]. Nonetheless, Defendants and each of them, seized Plaintiff
and against Plaintiffs will confined and imprisoned
him and subjected him to involuntary commitment and
treatment for a period from December 10, 1981, to May
7, 1982. For said period of 149 days, Plaintiff was
without the benefit of counsel and no hearing of any
sort was held at which he could have challenged his
involuntary admission and treatment at FSH. Defendants, and each of them, deprived Plaintiff of his liberty without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants acted with wilful, wanton and reckless disregard and indifference to Plaintiffs Constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.'0
These charges no doubt surprised and upset Burch's caretakers at Tallahassee and Chattahoochee, who had, as they saw
it, restored to a very sick man the ability to function in the
community. But in the world of legal complaints, where a
verbal kick in the teeth to one's "adversary" comes as naturally
as the portrayal of the plaintiff as virtuous victim, this is
unexceptional.
A hard look at the substance of Burch's contentions, however, reveals them as more than a little baffling. On the one
hand, Burch complained that, given the alleged legal worthlessness of his consent to be treated as a voluntary patient, he had
in effect been treated as an involuntary one. On the other
hand, the driving theory of his suit was that he should have
been treated as an involuntary patient on the ground of his
claimed legal ineligibility for voluntary status.
But the most troublesome aspect of the suit was its implication that persons like Burch, provided voluntary care when

10

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 121 (1990).
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found sick and hurt, a'e somehow better served by being subjected to some compulsory, costly, time-consuming, and antitherapeutic legal process before they can be -treated (if then)."
Originally drafted in 1871, the section 1983 law12 under
which Burch filed his suit gave plaintiffs in civil rights cases
direct access to the federal courts. The law was based on the
theory that plaintiffs in such cases might not get justice in the
state and local courts. Over the years, especially during the
1960s and 1970s, the reach of this civil rights law has expanded
substantially beyond its original focus to where, today, the
overwhelming number of its users are plaintiffs in institutional
settings like prisons and mental hospitals, especially the former. 3 But there are limits, procedural conditions to be met:
not every grievance or complaint fied by an institutionalized
person may be brought directly into federal court under section
1983.14

" The preference in medicine and law for voluntary admissions, and
presumed competency to volunteer, that has dominated mental hospital intake
since the mid-1960s is grounded in therapeutic reasons. See supranote 5 and
infratext accompanying note 29. Compulsory intervention usually takes place
in the later stages of mental illness and the compulsory process itself may be
time consuming. The negative therapeutic consequences of delayed treatment
are well documented. See generally Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis,
Taking HarmsSeriously: InvoluntaryMental Patientsand the Right to Refuse
Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429 (1991). Finally, today's restrictive commitment, or substituted judgment, standards increase the likelihood that substantial numbers of mentally ill persons who would consensually seek treatment,
or not object to it if prompted, would not qualify for involuntary hospitalization.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). Its popular name, significantly,
was the Ku
Klux Klan Act.
"3In 1991, there were 26,716 civil rights actions filed by prisoners alone
(presumably all § 1983 actions) versus 20,236 filings from other sources (about
half in areas - voting rights, housing, employment and public aid - that
suggest use of federal provisions other than § 1983). FED. JUD. WORKLOAD
STAT. (DEc. 31, 1991), prepared by Admin. Off. of the Fed. Cts., at 32-3.
'1 The relevant precedents are mainly from the prison setting: Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). These cases stand for the propositions that
plaintiffs should not have direct access to the federal courts when (1) their
complaints are trivial, (2) the official actions complained of are in the nature
of random negligence, and (3) the states provide adequate "pre-deprivation"
remedies or, due to the nature of the injuries or injurious actions, can only
provide adequate post-injury remedies. The federal district court and the
Circuit Court of Appeals read this line of cases to require initial dismissal of
Burch's suit.
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These limits stymied Burch at the district court level, where
his complaint was summarily dismissed. 5 Burch then appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, but that court
sustained the district court's dismissal. 6 The appeals court
agreed with the trial court that Burch's suit was not a proper
section 1983 action because the State of Florida provided plaintiffs like Burch with a viable opportunity to obtain justice in its
own state courts by way of its tort liability law. Though constitutionally disfavored as "postdeprivation" in nature, the tort
option was held to be an adequate remedial procedure, indeed
the only possible one, in a case of this kind.
Perhaps uneasy at having so easily side-stepped the merits
of Burch's complaint, the Circuit Court of Appeals took the
unusual step of rehearing the case - this time "en bane" with
a full complement of thirteen judges as distinct from the threemember panel which had rendered the initial decision. On the
basis of this reconsideration, the court reversed itself. Burch's
section 1983 action was proper after all, and the substance of
his troublesome claims and their implications would have to be
considered.'"
Faced with this prospect, the State of Florida appealed.
Under the name of Dr. Zinermon, Burch's treating physician at
the state hospital, it filed a petition for review with the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted this petition and in February of 1990, some eight years after Burch had
been picked up and hospitalized, the High Court handed down
its decision in Zinermon v. Burch. 9 Responding to the procedural question that had dominated the litigation below concerning the propriety of Burch's section 1983 route into the federal
system, the Court concluded that the Circuit Court of Appeals'
second opinion was correct: Burch was indeed entitled to direct
access to the federal courts.
Had the Supreme Court premised its holding strictly on
technical grounds, Zinermon v. Burch might have raised some
eyebrows among civil rights litigation specialists, but little else.

15 Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 804 F.2d 1549,

1551 (11th Cir. 1986).
16 Id.
17Id.
8

Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Serv., 840 F.2d 797 (11th

Cir. 1988).
"9Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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The larger, ominous implications for the mental health system
would have taken years to unfold, as the Burch complaint
reworked its way through the courts on the merits, assuming it
did not die a merciful death somewhere along the route. (Indeed, the case was settled shortly after the Supreme Court
decision for a total of $35,000, including damages, costs and
attorney fees.) 20 However, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the

majority tipped the Court's hand on matters well beyond the
procedural issues, intimating an agreement in principle with
Burch's substantive position. Although the merits of the suit
were never tried, they were in effect decided by the Court,
thereby depositing Zinermon v. Burch squarely on the list of socalled landmark cases.
To justify its essentially counter-precedential holding that
a section 1983 suit was proper in Burch's case, the Court had to
find that the alleged violation by Florida officials (the doctors
and the intake personnel) was not just a random event for
which there can only be an after-the-fact ("postdeprivation")
remedy, but rather that it was a predictable development which
could and should have been prevented via a "predeprivation"
procedure.
The Court managed this in the following fashion. It interpreted the Florida law to prohibit the treatment of "incompetent" persons as voluntary patients, a conclusion made relatively easy by virtue of Florida's atypical requirement that an
applicant give his "express and informed consent" for voluntary
admission to a mental facility.2 Having established what
cannot be done, the Court then prescribed what Florida officials
should do. Arguing, reasonably, that applicants for voluntary
admission to mental hospitals might not be competent, the
Court created an affirmative duty that their competency be
investigated. Since Florida law failed to require such investigations, ergo, the violation of the duty was entirely predictable,
and the state officials could be sued directly in the federal

'o Telephone Interview with Louis Hubener, Florida State Attorney Genera's Office (June 12, 1991).
21 FLA. STAT. ch. 394.465(1)(a) (1981). Most states do not have such an
explicit consent provision. Rather, they operate on the theory that the patient
satisfies his voluntary status through reasonable explanation and disclosure
efforts, made in the absence of coercion or deceit, without need for the state to
concern itself with the patiens rationality or "competency."
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system, and 'found
liable if at trial the plaintiff could prove their
22
"dereliction."
Such is the tortuous majesty of the law. Via an awkward,
technical argument that gives scant attention to practical
consequences, the Supreme Court has ushered in the brave new
world where Burch's ungrateful and graceless complaint is
validated. While his case has been settled for a paltry sum that
will barely cover the costs and fees, Burch's concept of competency has been endorsed by the Court, endorsed to the point
where it eviscerates the voluntary treatment model. The rescue
and treatment - on a voluntary basis - of a person who was
clearly severely ill has resulted in a legal case which threatens
to make involuntary treatment once again the norm. In the
name of competency, treatment may once again be available
only through the coercive apparatus of the state, whether by
direct court order or via the fiction of substituted consent. For
the many who will either resist this compulsory process or who
fail to meet its strict "eligibility" criteria, treatment may not be
available at all.
How did the law get to this absurd and profoundly antipatient point? It started - as it has ended - with changes in
the competency law. And the law has developed as it has
because an abolitionist movement that sees its mission as
keeping people out of institutions was able to turn to its own
end legal changes won by reformers hoping to encourage and
improve treatment of the mentally ill.

' It may be worth noting, as the dissenting opinion does at Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 142 (1990), that Burch's allegation of the defendant's
willful, wanton and reckless disregard of his rights contradicts the majority's
findings that the state's violation was predictable. Another small irony of the
case is that despite the majority's conclusion that the Florida law was defective, Burch's suit explicitly disavowed any challenge to the validity or constitutionality of the law, id. at 36, 149.
' See supra note 6. Dr. Paul Appelbaum, director of the law and psychiatry program at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, notes that
what little research there is on the capacities of patients to consent to hospitalization suggests that a large majority of presently voluntary patients would
have difficulty making competent decisions about their treatment. According
to Appelbaum, almost 1.2 million admissions are voluntary. If two-thirds had
difficulty making competent decisions, that would mean 800,000 patients who
would have to go through the commitment process, overwhelming the courts.
And of course a great many of these patients would not meet the "dangerousness to self or others" criterion for involuntary commitment. See Appelbaum,
supra note 6, 1060.
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I. CIVIL RIGHTS FOR MENTAL PATIENTS
The initial salvo in the battle for these legal changes were
hearings on protecting the rights of the mentally ill conducted
by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1961
and 1963.24
A series of expos6s in the late 1940s had focused attention
on the terrible conditions in many state mental hospitals.25
Nonetheless, until the mid-1950s, the number of patients in
state hospitals continued to rise, peaking at over 550,000 in
1955. Many of these patients were warehoused in mental
hospitals for life. Yet the law imposed few obstacles to involuntary commitment. Vague statutes such as those of Massachusetts were not unusual: a person could be committed who was
subject to a "character disorder" rendering him so deficient in
"judgment or emotional control" that he was "likely to conduct
himself in a manner which clearly violates the established...
conventions ...

of the community."2 6

Once committed, the patient was likely to suffer constricting
civil disabilities. By law in some states, by custom in others, he
was automatically deemed to be "incompetent" - to write a will,
marry, dispose of property, enter into contracts, vote - even to
drive a car. This status clung to him even after he left the
hospital.2
Once civil rights became a major issue in the 1950s, the
absence of civil rights for mental patients inevitably gained

24See supra note 5.
25 See ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATEs (1949), MIKE GORMAN,
OKLAHOMA ATrACKS ITS SNAKE PITs (1948) and MIKE GORMAN, EVERY OTHER

BED (1956) and the report on conditions in state hospitals by Albert Q. Maisel,
Bedlam 1946, LIFE, May 6, 1946, at 102.
26 NICHOLAS N. KIrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT:

DEVIANCE AND

ENFORCED THERAPY 68 (1971) (citing MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123,
op. 1965)).

§ 1 (Law. Co-

1963 Hearings,supra note 5, at 41. Senator Sam Ervin noted that in
North Carolina, for example, the court automatically appointed a guardian to
a committed patient and deprived the patient of virtually all his rights.
Patients were often discharged on probation or conditionally. Therefore, it
could be a long time before the court issued a certification of sanity restoring
the former patient his rights. Even then, moreover, individuals gave testimony that in some jurisdictions, when a former patient tried to regain his driving
license, the Department of Motor Vehicles official asked him if he had ever
been in a mental hospital. If he said no, he had perjured himself and if he
said yes, he would probably be denied a license.
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2
attention. As Albert Deutsch, whose The Shame of the States
had been the most influential of all the expos6s, put it at the
Senate committee's 1961 hearings: "In a period when civil
rights for minority groups constitute a major national
issue,
29
theirs remain the most ignored and neglected of all. ,
The Senate committee described its goal as paving the way
for "sound, effective legislation... so that the patient's constitutional rights can be protected without unduly hampering his
medical needs."3 ° Unfortunately, this characterization of the
patient's plight as a civil rights/minority issue easily resulted in
the second part of the committee's statement being forgotten the caveat about his medical needs.
Much of the testimony at both hearings concerned the
mental patient's loss of civil rights as the price paid for treatment. The hearings also focused on the importance of encouraging patients to enter treatment voluntarily. Many of the psychiatrists who spoke at the hearings saw an intrinsic connection
between voluntary treatment and preservation of patients' civil
rights. Speaking on behalf of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) at the 1963 hearing, Dr. Zigmond Lebensohn testified that mental hospitals should be "looked upon as treatment
centers for sick people in the same sense that general hospitals
are still viewed."'" For mental patients to lose their civil
rights was not only practically, but also psychologically, disabling. It was anti-therapeutic."
In 1963 the Senate drafted a model bill for the District of
Columbia addressing both major concerns of the 1961 hearings. 3 It used both carrot and stick to encourage greater use
of voluntary treatment. The bill made voluntary treatment
more accessible by mandating that any public hospital in the
District (in practice St. Elizabeths) take any patient who requested admission for evaluation, diagnosis or treatment. The
bill further specified that patients would not lose any of their
civil rights by virtue of hospitalization.

' See supra note 5. Both Deutsch and Gorman (even more vigorously)
followed up on their expos6s by becoming advocates for changing the laws and
improving treatment of the mentally ill.
' 1961 Hearings,supra note 5, at 41.
Id.at 9.
31 1963 Hearings,supra note 5, at 61.
30

32

Id. at 66.

31Id. at 1-5, 6-11.
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Wielding the stick, the bill discouraged involuntary hospitalization by making it more difficult. The bill sought to base
involuntary commitment exclusively on the state's police power,
limiting its use to the individual who, because of mental illness,
was "likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at
liberty."34 Part of the subcommittee's rationale was that the
benevolent parens patriae power lent itself too readily to overreaching and abuse.35
The District of Columbia adopted a modified form of the
Senate's bill in 1964.6 Within little more than a decade almost all states had incorporated the bill's two distinctive features into their commitment law: that patients retain all civil
rights upon hospitalization, i.e., are presumed to be legally
competent, and that they be found dangerous to others or to
themselves (or at least so gravely disabled as to present such an
overt danger) before they could be involuntarily committed.3

MId. at 3.
' Richard Arens, speaking on behalf of the ACLU, and Raymond Chasan,
a New Jersey attorney, emphasized this point in the 1961 Hearings. 1961
Hearings, supra note 5, at 207-31.
36 1963 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1-5. The model bill had a provision
(albeit a weak one, in the view of Morton Birnbaum, who originated the
concept) for recognition and enforcement of "the right to treatment":
Each patient hospitalized in any public hospital for a mental illness,
shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment ....[Tihe administrator of each public
hospital shall submit.. . a report giving a detailed account of the
type of medical and psychiatric care and treatment which... has
been provided by such hospital to each patient hospitalized therein
for a mental illness.
Morton A. Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 758 n.23
(1969). Birnbaum observed that the final bill dropped any reference as to how
the right should be enforced: "A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and
psychiatric care and treatment." Id. (citing D.C. Code Ann. § 21-562 (1967)).
Nonetheless the D.C. Court of Appeals in Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451
(D.C. Cir. 1966), found there was a statutory right to treatment under the
D.C. Act; Birnbaum felt this was a strained reading of the Act because the
language was "similar to that used in public mental hospital statutes of ten
other jurisdictions: in none of these other jurisdictions has this precatory
phrasing been interpreted to mean that there exists a recognized enforceable
right to treatment." Id. For a discussion of the provisions of the D.C. Act and
its subsequent interpretation, see generally id.
31 See SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET. AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW, 21-176, 369-433 (1985).
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The problem with these "reforms" was that they were built
upon false premises. Mental patients are not the equivalent of
heart or cancer patients. When psychotic patients present
themselves or are sent to the hospital, they are usually confused, disorganized, hallucinating, delusional - incompetent, by
strict legal standards, to make "informed" decisions about many
things, including treatment. Their presumed competency is a
fiction. Dangerousness is no more apposite as the guiding
criterion for hospitalization. As psychiatrist Stephen Rachlin
has stated, dangerousness is not a disease or any form of diagnostic entity.38 When a patient is dangerous, it is often because he has inappropriately been allowed to deteriorate,
untreated. Hospitalization should come before a person slips to
this point.
II. THE MENTAL HEALTH BAR'S
ANTI-TREATMENT AGENDA
If everyone involved in shaping mental health policy had
shared the goal of encouraging treatment for the mentally ill,
the introduction of false premises into mental health law might
not have mattered: they would have served as white lies to
advance useful social purposes. Permitting patients to keep
their civil rights was clearly desirable on public policy grounds,
and the definition of dangerousness, "likely to injure himself or
others"39 was sufficiently flexible to permit the broadest of
interpretations - "injury" could be psychological as well as
physical.
But in the decade following the Senate hearings, a movement emerged that denied the very existence of mental illness.
Sparked by maverick psychiatrists and politically radical therapists and adopted by mainstream sociologists, it flourished in
the militantly anti-institutional climate of the 1960s counterculture.40 British psychiatrist Ronald Laing, a countercultural
guru, popularized the view of schizophrenia as a natural LSD
trip, a "voyage of discovery" leading to higher forms of percep-

' Stephen Rachlin, Civil Commitment, ParensPatriae and the Right to
Refuse Treatment, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 174, 177 (1979).
39 1963 Hearings, supra note 5, at 3.
40 RAEL J. ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 21-25
(1990).
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tion.41 The New Left provided a political twist: in an insane
society, insanity was the true sanity, the mad rejecting the
unacceptable, irrational reality of a rotten social system, while
those called sane conformed to the sick values of the culture.
Insanity, in this view, was a lofty form of political dissidence.42
Sociologists gave these notions academic respectability.
Mental illness was a "label," and who was labeled an accident,
if not an act of malice: those brought by their families or other
authorities into the purview of official agencies for control of socalled mental illness were stigmatized and isolated simply
because their behavior was offensive to prevailing tastes, politics or morals. In his famous 1961 study Asylums, sociologist
Erving Goffman described how much of mental illness was
institutionally "learned behavior" and how mental hospitals
produced "deculturation," the loss of habits needed to survive in
the wider society.4"
The logical conclusion was that mental patients needed
lawyers, not doctors. Accordingly, in the late 1960s and early
1970s, a group of public interest lawyers - without knowledge
of or interest in mental illness as such - established an informal mental health bar." Many of these attorneys worked in

41 ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at 30 (citing RONALD D. LAiNG, THE
POLrIcs OF EXPERIENCE 167 (1967)).
42 ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at 26-27. The most uncompromising

voice of all was that of libertarian psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, an unlikely
countercultural hero in that he despised the left. Szasz has called psychiatry
a form of "quackery because it offers cures for which there are no diseases."
Leonard R. Frank, Tom Szasz: Freedom Fighter, MADNESS NETWORK NEWS,
Nov. 1972, at 13. Szasz disposes of mental illness by verbal sleight of hand.
"Mental illnesses do not exist; indeed they cannot exist, because the mind is
not a bodily part or bodily organ." THOMAS SZASZ, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE
15 (1984).
"' ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at 46. Asylums was based on fieldwork
Goffman had done in 1955-56 at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C.,
then a federal institution with 7,000 inmates. Goffman argued that the
institution caused the very deviant behavior it was meant to cure. Id. at 4647. In InteractionRitual (1967), he made the same points even more strongly.
The inmate was exposed to relentless "abasements, degradation, humiliation
and profanations of self." Goffman observed: "If you rob people of all customary means of expressing anger and alienation and put them in a place where
they have never had better reason for these feelings, then the natural recourse
will be to seize upon what remains - situational improprieties." Id. at 47
(citing ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RrrUAL 147 (1967)).
" Bruce Ennis, the founder of the mental health bar, has described how he
became involved. He applied for a position as staff attorney at the New York

102 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol.2:89

government-funded legal services programs. The bar's ideological and logistical center became the Mental Health Law Project,
founded in 1972, which for years functioned as a Legal Services
Corporation backup center.
A 1973 symposium in The Santa Clara Lawyer4 5 set forth
the goal of the emergent mental health bar as the abolition of

involuntary mental hospitalization. In his introduction, Thomas
Shaffer, then dean of Notre Dame Law School, described institutional confinement of the mentally ill as a "festering evil" and
declared that "[tihese authors.., have a target in their sights,
and they are not out primarily to analyze the target; they are
out to destroy it." Shaffer noted that "[t]he ultimate objective
really, is to abolish institutional psychiatry."4 6 In an interview
the following year, Bruce Ennis, who inaugurated the New York
Civil Liberties Union's special project on the rights of mental
patients in 1968 and is widely regarded as the "father" of the
mental health bar, was similarly candid: "My personal goal is
either to abolish involuntary commitment or to set up so many
procedural roadblocks and hurdles that it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the state to commit people against their will."4 7
A. THE MENTAL HEALTH BAR FOCUSES ON THE
DANGEROUSNESS STANDARD

The mental health bar quickly saw the potential of the
"dangerousness standard" for realizing its agenda (recognition of
the usefulness of the competency reforms came later). In state
after state, the mental health bar pushed vigorously to make

Civil Liberties Union: "I was told there were no openings for staff attorneys

but that the New York Civil Liberties Union was thinking of starting a special
project on the rights of the mentally handicapped and would I be interested.
My initial reaction was 'i don't know anything about that and I don't know if
I'd be interested or not.' I went home and then I went to a library and I
looked under law and psychiatry' and found some books by a man named
Thomas Szasz which I found interesting from a civil liberties perspective and
I read more and I realized this was a very, very big problem about which most
people, including myself, knew nothing." ISAAC AND ARMAT, supra note 40, at
109-10.
" Symposium, Mental Illness, the Law, and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA
CLARA L. 367 (1973).
4'Thomas L. Shaffer, Introduction, 13 SANTA CLARA L. 371 (1973).
47 ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at 111 (citing Leonard R. Frank, An
Interview with Bruce Ennis, MADNESS NETWORK NEWS READER 163 (1974)).
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dangerousness the sole standard for commitment, to narrow the
definition of danger, and to graft criminal procedure safeguards
onto civil commitment procedures. Once commitment was based
upon the state's police power, the mental health bar could argue
cogently that it assumed a quasi-criminal character. Under
those circumstances, those "accused" of being "dangerous"
because they were mentally ill deserved all the protections of
the criminal justice system.
48
The single most significant case was Lessard v. Schmidt,
brought by Milwaukee Legal Services. In 1972, a federal
district court declared Wisconsin's civil commitment statutes
unconstitutional. Ruling that "the interests in avoiding civil
commitment are at least as high as those of persons accused of
criminal offenses," the court called for the same due process
safeguards against unjustified deprivation of liberty that are
accorded those accused of crime.49 These included effective
and timely notice of "charges" justifying detention; adversary
counsel; impermissibility of "hearsay evidence"; the privilege
against self-incrimination; and a standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court also defined dangerousness very
narrowly: "the state must bear the burden of proving that there
is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined, he
will do immediate harm to himself or others."5 °
In the wake of the Lessard decision, state legislatures
around the country hastened to change their commitment
statutes to ensure that their laws provided mental patients with
the new court-defined constitutional rights. In addition, courts
increasingly required "overt acts" to prove dangerousness to
others.5 ' In states where remnants of the parens patriae power survived, courts came to define "grave disability" as imminent
dangerousness to self. In some jurisdictions, in practice the
patient was committable only if it could be shown that, failing
commitment, he would die within thirty days.5"

" Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972).
Id. at 1090.

49

0 Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).
51 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABIrIY LAw § 2.13 (1989). Perlin notes that the
requirement for "overt acts" to prove dangerousness is not uniform, with case
law in some states supporting the position that psychiatrists can determine
dangerousness through clinical examination without need for a recent overt

act.
52

This is the case, for example, in Philadelphia.

The county solicitor
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The effect of all this was to shift authority in the mental
health system from psychiatrists to lawyers, at the expense of
the mental patient. Lawrence Galie, a disillusioned civil commitment attorney, complained that often, the more effective the
attorney, the worse off the client. He noted that the adversarial
system was simply inappropriate to civil commitment, where
the patient's release could have a devastating impact first and
foremost on the client, whom the lawyer was supposed to serve
and protect.53
Many in the civil libertarian bar thought that abolition of
all civil commitment was around the corner. Having narrowed
the criterion for commitment to dangerousness, they hoped to
invalidate that last basis on both practical and constitutional
grounds. This was a reasonable expectation in that the logical
arguments against the dangerousness standard were in fact
much better than those against the need-for-treatment standard
which had crumbled so easily. While psychiatrists could diagnose psychosis with reasonable reliability, they could not predict
dangerousness with comparable confidence. 4 Violence is an
event with a low base rate, i.e., comparatively rare, which
makes overprediction inevitable. Suppose one person out of a
1000 will kill and a 95% accurate test for predicting who would

reported: "The way the law is now, the doctor has to testify that if the
behavior continues for a period of 30 days, serious debilitation or death will
result. That's a difficult thing to show." ISAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at
256. In Milwaukee, families have found even stricter time limits imposed in
practice. For example, in a letter on its experience in trying to obtain treatment for a severely ill son, the family wrote: "In Milwaukee County, the
definition of 'danger to self should be reevaluated. To have to wait to file a
3-party petition until a person is 24 hours from death is gross neglect." Letter
from "Concerned Parents" to Howard Fuller, Director of Milwaukee County
Health and Human Services (Nov. 14, 1990) (on file with the Cornell Journal
of Law and Public Policy).
13 Lawrence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: OrHow
I Learned to Hate the Adversary System 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71, 85 (1978).
' One of the earliest and most scathing attacks on psychiatry on this
ground is Bruce Ennis and Thomas Litwack's Psychiatryand the Presumption
of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
However, more recent research and writing provide grounds for a more
sanguine assessment of the psychiatrist's capacity to contribute to the dangerousness issue, particularly in regard to narrowed populations and situations.
John Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered:
Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 249 (1988). See also
Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionalityand Morality of Civilly Committing
Violent Sexual Predators,14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709 (1992).
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do so existed. That would mean if 100,000 people were tested,
out of the 100 who would kill, 95 would be detected. But so too
would an additional 4,905 people who would not kill be identified as potential killers."5 Since not even the best psychiatrist
could be expected to achieve a 95% prediction accuracy with
respect to dangerousness, the application of this standard to
civil commitment resulted in casting the net far too wide.
But if the dangerousness standard thus led to the commitment of many people who would neither imminently commit
suicide nor immediately attack others if they were free, the
standard arguably was nothing more than unconstitutional
preventive detention. An article in the Santa ClaraLawyer56
declared that confinement for "dangerousness" was "an arbitrary
and unreasonable deprivation of liberty" that was "incompatible
with the tenets of liberal democracy and more particularly with
the constitutional order."
Nonetheless, seeing the dangerousness standard as a
protection for society, legislators and judges alike have been
unwilling to dispense with it. The dangerousness standard has
held firm even though the attack on it received support from an
unexpected quarter. Organized psychiatry endorsed its critics'
claim that psychiatrists were unable to predict violence and
advised its members to avoid such predictions. 57 The motivations for this concession were diverse. One was the fear of
malpractice suits." Also, psychiatrists had been stung in
55 Joseph Livermore et al., On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment,
117
U. PA. L. REV. 75, 84 (1968).

Julian R. Friedman & Robert W. Daly, Civil Commitment and the
Doctrine of Balance: A Critical Analysis, 13 SANTA CLARA L. 503-4, 509
56

(1973).
The American Psychiatric Association informed the U.S. Supreme Court
in an amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), that two out of
three predictions of long term future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong.
Eminent forensic psychiatrist Robert L. Sadoff said: "[A] psychiatrist has no
expertise in the prediction of dangerousness." See 1 PERLIN, supra note 51 at
121, 126. And Alan Stone, past president of the American Psychiatric
Association, declared: "It can be stated flatly.., that neither objective
actuarial tables nor psychiatric intuition, diagnosis and psychological testing
can claim predictive success when dealing with the traditional population of
mental hospitals." Id.
' In 1976, a California Supreme Court case sent tremors throughout the
psychiatric profession. The parents of Tatiana Tarasoff, a University of
California student murdered by her mentally ill, rejected boyfriend, successfully sued a college therapist for failing to warn her of his homicidal fantasies.
1
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particular by criticism of their death-dealing role in capital
sentencing cases.59 Finally, practitioners in institutional settings disliked the dangerousness standard because it forced
them to devote most of their efforts to individuals least likely to
benefit: young, violent males who moved between prisons and
mental hospitals and did not respond to anti-psychotic medication.
Unable to eliminate the dangerousness standard, the
mental health bar has resorted to entangling the system with
procedural wrangles and in a "never-ending battle in the courtrooms to determine precisely what sort of an 'overt act' justifies
a finding of dangerousness, or exactly how much evidence of
self-neglect and self-damage is required to prove grave disability." In view of the plethora of real problems afflicting the
mentally ill and the agencies designed to assist this population,
this is an appalling waste of resources, serving "neither the
public's interests nor the client's," as "spurious disputes are
raised to ostensibly constitutional levels and taken to the
highest courts. 60
The boyfriend had confided them to him and he notified the campus police,
urging that the young man be hospitalized. Although it was the police,
operating under the rigors of California law, who refused to press for his
hospitalization, the court ruled the therapist - not the police - could be held
liable. Tarasoff left psychiatrists eager to give up any claims to expertise in
predicting dangerousness. Tarasoffv. Regents of University of California, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
59
See, e.g., Charles P. Ewing, 'Dr.Death' and the Case for an Ethical Ban
on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital
Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407 (1983). See also Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Barefoot v. Estelle however, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the logic of official psychiatry's withdrawal from cases
involving future dangerousness predictions. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983). Barefoot, like Smith, was a capital case, a context in which the
psychiatric prediction can literally mean the difference between life and death.
oSamuel Jan Brakel, Legal Schizophrenia and the Mental HealthLawyer:
Recent Trends in Civil Commitment Litigation, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 3 (1988).
The article cites a Minnesota case, In the Matter of Bruce Carlton Wollan, as
illustrative. Id. at 12-13. Wollan had attacked his sister with a meat cleaver.
After being released from confinement for this offense, he had stabbed his
mother to death. The jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity. A few
years later, the hospital proposed to make him eligible for a pass, allowing
him to leave the hospital alone for up to ten days. Wollan's sister argued she
was an "interested person" under the law and had a right to participate in a
special review board hearing. Incredibly, Wollan's attorney argued that
Wollan's sister was not an interested party, appealing the case right up to
Minnesota's highest court, at which point seven attorneys were involved in the
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B. CREATING A LEGAL RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

As the mental health bar realized that it could not end
commitment as readily as it once thought, it turned its attention
to the possibility of a more indirect attack, on the purpose of
commitment, namely treatment. If individuals committed to
hospitals for treatment could not in fact be treated, the very
basis for their confinement would vanish. The mental health
bar soon realized that the dangerousness standard could be
used to assert a legal right to refuse treatment, a right hitherto
undreamed-of in the context of involuntary hospitalization for
mental illness.
As long as patients were hospitalized on the ground that
they needed treatment, it seemed a contradiction in terms to
advance a "right to refuse treatment." Indeed, reformers like
Morton Birnbaum, 6 who in 1960 first advanced the concept of
a "right to treatment," explicitly defined treatment as the quid
pro quo for commitment. Birnbaum argued that since the civilly
committed individual was guilty of no crime, the only basis on
which the state could deprive him of liberty was if he received,
in return for that deprivation, treatment for his illness.
Not surprisingly then, the notion of a "right to refuse treatment" at first seemed bizarre. In 1974, Ennis himself, while
declaring that obtaining such a right was his "goal," said: "I
think we are a long way from getting the judges to go that
far."62 That same year Harvard Law Review,63 in a major

case. At every level, the court ruled what was painfully obvious - that
Wollan's sister was indeed an interested party. In the Matter of Bruce
Carlton Wollan, 390 N.W.2d 839 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
In 1976 Congress created a Protection and Advocacy program for the
mentally ill, which in some states has become a federally funded playground
for the mental health bar. These programs, as prominent mental health bar
member Michael Perlin says, promise to "exponentially" increase suits for
"substantive rights of the institutionalized." See 1 PERLIN, supra note 51, at
799. In addition, they are likely to add to the "procedural junk" (to paraphrase Ralph Slovenko, a rare lawyer-critic of the mental health bar) already
obstructing care of the mentally ill.
6
Birnbaum's seminal article was Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960).
62 IsAAC & ARMAT, supra note 40, at 167.
Note, Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1344-1358 (1974). While conceding the incongruity of
failing to treat patients hospitalized under the parens patriae power, the
article argued for extending a right to refuse to legally competent patients,
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review of civil commitment law permeated by anti-psychiatric
assumptions, nonetheless declared that treatment was inherent
in the decision to commit a mental patient involuntarily under
the parens patriae power, for it would be incongruous if an
individual could frustrate the very reason for the state's action
by refusing treatment.
Courts dismissed the notion that hospitals could absolve
themselves of the duty to treat by citing the patient's refusal of
treatment. In 1969, in Whitree v. State," a New York court
granted an ex-patient $300,000 damages on the ground that if
he had been treated adequately he could have been released in
two years, not the twelve years for which he was confined. The
court dismissed the hospital's argument that the patient had
refused all medication, on the grounds it was "illogical, unprofessional and not consonant with prevailing medical standards."
Similarly, in that same year, in Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hospital,' the Massachusetts Supreme
Court condemned as poor practice the hospital's failure to
medicate a patient involuntarily.
But once the parens patriae basis for treating the patient
was abandoned, and the state committed the individual only
because he was dangerous, commitment and treatment were
divorced. In a series of "right to refuse treatment" cases in the
1980s,6" the mental health bar argued that society had accomplished its purpose by segregating the individual from the
community and had no right to further intrude upon his liberty
by imposing treatment against his will. Courts endorsed this
reasoning. In Rennie v. Klein, 7 a pioneering right to refuse
case, the trial judge ruled that "[t]he fact that the patient is
dangerous in free society may give the state power to confine,

hospitalized under the state's police power.
" 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1968).
65 233 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1968).
66 The most influential were Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982);
Rogers v. Okn,478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.Mass. 1979), affd in part,rev'd in part,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982); In the Matter of Guardianship of Roe HI,421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981);
and Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
67 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
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but standing alone it does not give the power to treat involuntarily. Once confined, the patient cannot hurt those outside."6
As it drew out the implication of the dangerousness doctrine, the mental health bar began to realize that it had another
important tool in the separation of commitment from competency. Although instituted as a means to encourage patients and
their families to seek treatment, the mental health bar realized
that the assumption of legal competency could be used, in
conjunction with the dangerousness standard, to block treatment.
By the mid-1970s the statutes of virtually all states provided that hospitalized mental patients retained all of their rights,
i.e., that the law considered them to be legally competent,
unless a court specifically judged otherwise.69 But if they were
legally competent, argued the mental health bar, why should
not mental patients enjoy the same rights as any other patient?
Courts increasingly affirmed the patient's right of informed
consent to medical treatment. 0 (It is noteworthy that the
decision most often cited as precedent has been Judge Benjamin
Cardozo's ruling in a 1914 case, Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hospital,"'that "every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body." [Italics added] The mental health bar argued that since
the law now assumed mental patients to be competent, they
were legally of "sound mind," thus falling under the purview of
a decision that specifically excluded them!) The very legal
rights which reformers had bestowed upon patients in order to
foster treatment became an argument against treatment. Thus
in Rogers v. Okin,72 another pivotal right to refuse case, the
court stated that a patient was "presumed competent to manage
his affairs, dispose of property,

68Id.

. . .

and even to vote," but that

at 1145.

69 See BRAXEL ET AL., supra note 37, at 369-433.

'0See Katz, Informed Consent -A Fairy Tale? -Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT.
L. REV. 137 (1977); ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR
OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING (1989); and DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECIsIONMAKING (1991).
71 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
2 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.Mass. 1979), affd in part,rev'd in part,634 F.2d
650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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"such rights pale in comparison to the intimate decision as to

whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medication."73
In creating, at the instigation of the mental health bar, a
right to refuse treatment, courts were clearly influenced by their
perception that antipsychotic drugs were "dangerous." Beginning in the late 1960s, law journal articles on mental illness
almost without exception were permeated by anti-psychiatric
doctrine."4 Judicial decisions quoted most frequently two of
the most egregious articles: Robert Plotkin's Limiting the
Therapeutic Orgy7" and Eugene DuBose's Of the ParensPatriae
76
Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia.
Such articles ignored or minimized the proven effects of medication in controlling the symptoms of psychosis, elaborated all
possible side effects,7 7 and offered sinister - and false - portraits of the drugs as a species of "mind control."7
Relying on such "authorities," judges described the drugs in
the most lurid terms. In a seminal right to refuse case, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court declared that anti-psychotic
medications were "mind-altering," "powerful enough to immobilize both body and mind," and that their impact was "sufficient
to undermine the foundations of personality."7 9 In vain, the
73

Id. at 1361.

74See Brakel & Davis, supra note 11, at 437-441.
7 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978) (citing cases including United States v.
Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 978 n.13 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'ggrantedin part,opinion
vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 110 S.Ct. 3243 (1990); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 338
n.1 (N.Y. 1986)).
'660 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1976) (citing cases including Watson, 893 F.2d at
973 n.5; In re Jamie M., 184 Cal. Rptr. 778, 783 n.16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
" Like virtually all drugs, the neuroleptic drugs have side effects, most of
which doctors can control with additional medications. The most troublesome
side effect is tardive dyskinesia, an uncontrollable movement disorder that
affects between 20-30% of all long-term users of this drug. Fortunately, in the
vast majority of cases the disorder is not progressive and takes a mild form, so
that it is noticeable neither to the patient nor to those around him. However,
approximately five percent of those who develop tardive dyskinesia will
experience its severe disfiguring and disabling forms. See ISAAC & ARMAT,
supra note 40, at 235. Clozapine, approved by the FDA in 1989, apparently
does not produce tardive dyskinesia, but has a potentially fatal side effect,
agranulocytosis, requiring close monitoring. See id. at 237.

7 See Brakel & Davis, supra note 11, at 437-441.
In the Matter of Guardianship of Roe I1, 421 N.E.2d 41, 52 (Mass. 1981)
(quoting Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D. Mass. 1979)).
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American College of Neuropsychopharmacology filed an amicus
brief, stating that "[pisychotic disease alters the mind of afflicted patients; antipsychotic medication is mind-restorative. '
Courts outdid one another in expressing horror at the
supposed evil of the drugs. In 1986 an Arizona court 81 described medications as "insubstantially different from the shackles of old." It conceded that the state could forcibly inject a
patient in emergencies "just as it may shoot him if justified in
an emergency." Presumably the first was a fate little preferable
to the second.
Starting with Massachusetts, a series of state courts ruled
that, except in emergencies, before a psychiatrist could treat an
involuntarily committed patient against his will, a court would
have to find him, in a new adversarial hearing with the full
trappings of the criminal law, incompetent to make a treatment
decision." Even then, under the Massachusetts ruling, treatment would not necessarily follow: the court would decide not
on the basis of the patient's best interests, but rather would use
a "substituted judgment" standard.'
The ruling required
courts to try to decide what the incompetent mental patient
would want if he were competent, taking into account the fact
that he is incompetent. However mind-boggling, time-consuming, or costly, the law required that the exercise be done.
A study by the Massachusetts Department of Mental
HealthM of the first eighteen months under the new procedures found millions of dollars in direct (i.e., money that had to
be appropriated by the legislature for lawyer and expert witness
fees) and indirect costs. Psychiatrists and other clinical staff
spent thousands of hours preparing affidavits, diverting effort
from patient care. There were delays as long as eleven months
before hearings, with waiting periods of eight to ten weeks
common. In the end, however, the courts ruled in favor of
treating involuntarily 97% of the patients.

' Brief for the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology as Amicus
Curiae at 11 n.10, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (No. 80-1411).
81

Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 406 (1986).

82 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic
Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 414 nn.1
& 8-25 (1988).
' In the Matter of GuardianshipofRoe, 421 N.E.2d at 56-59.
"Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil, Aftermath of the Rogers Decision, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348, 1351 (1990).
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In New York, the situation is even worse. Legal procedures
have been grafted on top of existing administrative ones, with
the latter having to be exhausted before the former can begin.
At one institution studied, the additional cost simply for keeping
untreated patients in the hospital waiting for legal procedures
to begin averaged over $10,500 per patient.8 5
Why are so few refusals upheld in court hearings, particularly when, as in both Massachusetts and New York, even if it
finds the patient incompetent, the court uses a substituted
judgment standard? Psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum8 6 has found
that in practice, judges, to their credit, are primarily interested
in finding out if the patient is likely to respond to medication.
Expecting courts to make substitute judgments for patients
without regard to the patient's or society's best interest has
fortunately proven to be unrealistic. A study conducted at
Bridgewater State Hospital (for the criminally insane) confirms
this result; it found that judges were chiefly interested in how
"violent" the refusing patient was.
C. ABOLITIONISTS Now IN SIGHT OF GOAL

The mental health bar had viewed the right to refuse
treatment as a backdoor way of attacking involuntary commitment: if an individual could not be treated, there would be no
point in hospitalizing him. But like the mental health bar's
previous victories, widespread adoption of the right to refuse did
not achieve this broader purpose. The majority of involuntarily
committed patients do not reject proffered treatment. Exploitation of the abstract logic of the dangerousness standard and
separation of competency from commitment had damaged the
mental health system, but had not brought it to a halt.
But with Zinermon v. Burch the anti-psychiatric bar may
have its goal in reach. Unknowingly," the Supreme Court has
' J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to Refuse Treatment: Impact of Rivers v.
Katz, 18 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 210 (1990).

" Appelbaum, supra note 82, at 417.
Jorge Veliz & William S. James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice,144
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 66 (1987).
' It is doubtful the Supreme Court understood the implications of its
decision. Although the initial successes of the mental health bar had been in
federal court, in the latter part of the 1980s it concentrated as much as
possible on state courts and regarded an increasingly conservative Supreme
Court as especially unfriendly territory. In the same year it decided Zinermon
17
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struck at the heart of the fiction on which all state mental
health systems rest. The vast majority of mental patients are
not competent in any strict sense. By applying a reductive logic
to a structure depending upon false premises, the Supreme
Court has exposed the well-intentioned sham behind the "reformed" mental health system. But in doing so, it may well kill
the system.
Given their questionable capacity to give "informed consent," huge numbers of presently voluntary patients would have
to go through the procedures for involuntary commitment.
Then, the second misguided underpinning of our mental health
laws will again assume importance: that a patient must be
imminently "dangerous" in order to be involuntarily committed.
Apart from the enormous expense of requiring these large
numbers of commitment hearings, many of the voluntary patients in today's system would not even meet the statutory
standards for involuntary treatment in most states and would
have to be turned away.
On the surface Zinermon v. Burch applies only to states
that require patients to be able to give "informed consent" to
their admission and treatment in mental hospitals. Florida is
one of only a few states - although California, with the largest
population, is among them - to provide this by statute. But in
his decision Justice Blackmun strongly implied that in every
state voluntary patients would have to be screened for competence before hospitalization. 9 In addition, though the Zinermon Court rendered judgment only against the state hospital,
the private clinic having dropped out of the suit before the final
appeal, there is little question that the case's competency
inquiry mandate applies against all entities - public and
private - involved by virtue of state law and/or funds in the
administration of the state's mental health system.

v. Burch, the Supreme Court ruled against court intervention in a right to
refuse case involving a mentally ill prisoner. See Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990). Writing for the court, Justice Kennedy maintained that the
inmate's interests were "adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by
allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather
than a judge." Id. at 231. Interestingly, the decision did not focus upon the
issue of patient competence.

9 494 U.S. at 133, 137-38.
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D. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DAMAGE

Nor is this all. The Supreme Court's decision concerned
itself primarily with pre-admission duties and violations, though
Burch's initial complaint also challenged the validity of his postadmission consent to treatment. It cannot be long before a case
focusing squarely on the latter issue will be brought. The
argument will go like this: "Patients have a right to refuse
treatment. Courts will honor their decision if they are compe-

tent, and if they are incompetent, the court must provide a
substitute decision maker. My client may have signed a consent
to treatment form, but he was psychotic and had no idea of
what he was doing. The hospital had no right to take advantage of my client's incompetence; he was entitled to a court
hearing, legal counsel, and a judicial decision based on substituted judgment."
If this argument succeeds, the mental health bar will have
gained the procedural roadblocks it has long sought to immobilize the system.
III. RESTORING COMMON SENSE TO

MENTAL HEALTH LAW
The only way out of the present morass is to rewrite our
laws to address the realities of mental illness. Above all, this
means restoring the need for treatment as a ground for commitment. A few states have done so, although, in some cases, the
way they have done it may prevent the desired effect from being
achieved. 90

'0 For example, North Carolina's law authorizes commitment of one who is
dangerous to himself or others or "in need of treatment in order to prevent
further disability or deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-261(a) (Supp.1991). In 1980, Washington
broadened its "gravely disabled" standard. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 37,
at 23 n.14.
A new Texas statute permits both "temporary" (90 days) and "extended"
(12 months) commitment of a patient who "will, if not treated, continue to
suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, will
continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function independently,
and is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not
to submit to treatment." The other two criteria for involuntary hospitalization
- likely to cause serious harm to (1) self and (2) others - remain in place,
with the new standard representing a third alternative. Moreover, a jury or
judge must base a commitment decision under any of the three criteria only on
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Paradoxically, once states reinstitute the "need for treatment standard," treatment in the community will also become
much more feasible. Many of the mentally ill lying in our public
places respond to treatment: they were discharged from hospitals because they did so, and deteriorated when they stopped
taking medication. There are a wide variety of legal mechanisms (e.g., conditional release, outpatient commitment and
limited guardianship) that could be used to enforce treatment in
the community once the "need for treatment standard" is reinstituted. Under the dangerousness standard the individual is
"free" to deteriorate in the community until he becomes actively
dangerous.
How to deal with the competency barrier to hospital admission erected in Zinermon v. Burch is a more difficult question.
A sensible approach would seek to retain much of the sense and
efficiency of voluntary admission schemes as they operated
before Zinermon. While requiring competency inquiries, the
Supreme Court has not spelled out either their procedural or
substantive details. An American Psychiatric Task Force, 9 '
appointed to do damage-control in the wake of Zinermon, has

clear and convincing evidence presented by a recent overt act or a continuing
pattern of behavior that confirms the predicted behavior. And, in the case of
extended commitment, judge or jury must expect the patient's condition to
continue for 90 days, and he must have received at least 60 consecutive days
of court-ordered inpatient treatment during the preceding year. TEXAS
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.034-574.035 (West 1992).
In Wisconsin, in 1992, a bill to restore a need for treatment standard
passed the state Assembly by an overwhelming vote but stalled in the Senate.
The bill's sponsors announced they would introduce it again in the next
legislative session. Letter from Roz Libman, Alliance for the Mentally Ill of
Greater Milwaukee, to Rael Jean Isaac (Apr. 6, 1992) (on file with the Cornell
Journalof Law & PublicPolicy).
Other states where legal changes in this direction have been made
include Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, and South Carolina. With the exception of

Washington, the first state to make the change, where admissions reportedly
rose dramatically, the empirical effects have been underwhelming or perhaps
merely obscured by pre-existing trends or the counter-effects of unrelated
variables. Robert D. Miller, Need-for-Treatment-Criteriafor Involuntary Civil
Commitment: Impact in Practice, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1380, 1380 (1992).
9
Telephone Interview with Paul Appelbaun, A.F. Zelenik Distinguished
Professor of Psychiatry; Director, Law and Psychiatry Program, University of
Massachusetts (June 12, 1991). Having difficulty coming to agreement on
precise language, the Task Force is presently field-testing a formula. Letter
from Appelbaum to Samuel Jan Brakel (Jan. 3, 1992) (on file with the Cornell
Journalof Law and PublicPolicy).
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reportedly recommended in-hospital administrative decisions (as
opposed to full-blown judicial hearings) predicated on easy-tomeet substantive standards. A patient expressing agreement
with admission and treatment in any way, verbal, behavioral or
written, and displaying some minimal understanding of where
he is and why, would meet the competency requirements for
admission and initial treatment. Those individuals not competent even by such non-exacting standards would require substitute decisionmakers (family members whenever possible).9 2
But while such an approach could solve, or at least minimize the problems posed by Zinermon, the obvious danger is
that in establishing liberal competency standards so as to
permit voluntary patients to obtain treatment, the APA will be
paving the way for the mental health bar to achieve equivalent
easy competency standards for involuntary patients to refuse
treatment. All along, as we have seen, it has been the modus
operandi of the anti-psychiatric bar to misuse reforms designed
to achieve treatment to impede it for those most in need.93
Guardianships can be very valuable as a buffer-cum-information source
between the patient and the medical and legal system. The problem is that
persons with the desired ties to and concerns for the mentally ill patient are
often not available. Public guardianship is a poor substitute in the absence of
family guardians, inserting another inefficient bureaucratic layer without
providing the patient the benefit of a personal protector.
A new alternative is the health care proxy or the psychiatric living will.
Decisions about treatment preferences would be made by the patient while in
a state of good mental health or by the guardian-like desiguees. This would
be advantageous in that it gives greater control to the individual and because
it might make treatment more available to him. When their psychosis is in
remission, mentally ill people who recognize their potential need for future
treatment could arrange for an agent to authorize their hospitalization, even
though they had not deteriorated to the point of "dangerousness." However,
experience is lacking for an assessment of the medical value and legal validity
of treatment decisions made in periods of good health, before the psychiatric
crisis occurs.
A cautious approach may be in order, especially with respect to directives
that ban all treatment under certain circumstances or that bar certain
treatments under all circumstances. The law may need to provide a mechanism for overriding such treatment "refusals," as has been proposed for
example to the legislature in Saskatchewan, Canada in a paper prepared by
the British Columbia Schizophrenia Society. Response of the British Columbia
Schizophrenia Society to the British Columbia Ministry of Health Discussion
Paper on Mental Health Regulation 18 (1991) (paper is available from British
Columbia Schizophrenia Society, 6011 Westminster Highway, Richmond, B.C.
V7C484).
" Through the article we have referred to the anti-psychiatric bar (or,
92
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The only way to avoid this predictable outcome is for state
legislatures to recognize the critical distinction between voluntary and involuntary patients. Only in the case of the latter do
refusals pose a real problem. A voluntary patient should indeed
have a readily assertable right to refuse treatment. It would be
exercised, the empirical evidence suggests, in relatively rare
instances, at which point the hospital has the option to persuade, to discharge, or to institute involuntary commitment
proceedings.
By involuntarily committing a patient, a court in effect finds
that individual incompetent to make treatment decisions. 9 If
because of impaired judgment the individual cannot make a
decision on admission, neither can he make an informed decision to refuse treatment. In a decision departing from the
"lemming school of jurisprudence" that has characterized so
much recent mental health law, a Wisconsin district court in
1985 said bluntly: "Nonconsensual treatment is what involun-

interchangeably, the mental health bar) as if it had an identified membership
pursuing a set of defined goals and strategies. Lest we be challenged as
seeing more cohesion than there is, we wish to make clear that there is no
organized "mental health bar"and in this sense our writing is more metaphorical than literal. However, we believe the term is a valid one, describing
attorneys who have a common perspective on the role of law in addressing the
needs of the (so-called) mentally ill. For these attorneys, regardless of its
nature (and the mental health bar would include everything from believers in
the mental-illness-is-merely-a-label school to those who recognize it as a
medical illness), mental illness is to be treated legally as essentially a civil
rights issue and the role of law is to steadily expand the rights of patients,
including the right not to be a patient at all (regardless of how "sick" he may
be from a medical point of view). And while not formally organized, the
mental health bar has a variety of informal ties that are effective in promoting
this ideology and directing the path of legal action. In the 1970s legal services
groups funded by the Legal Services Corporation took a major role, and the
Mental Health Law Project, which had a clear-cut mental-health-as-civil-rights
ideology, was the Legal Services Corporation backup center providing research
and other aid to the local groups on mental illness cases. Law journals have
been hospitable to articles advancing these ideas to the point that it is rare to
find an article expressing a different view. The Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter is particularly important in disseminating what is essentially
an anti-medical perspective. In the last few years the lawyers funded by
Protection and Advocacy programs have taken a leadership role and many
attend annually (at government expense) the meetings of NARPA (National
Association of Rights Protection and Advocacy) which takes an extremely
radical anti-psychiatric line and where speakers suggest the kinds of lawsuits
they believe will most advance the cause of patients' rights.
' See Brakel & Davis, supra note 11.
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tary commitment is all about."95 Involuntary hospitalization
without involuntary treatment is a sham, turning commitment
into a police operation and hospitalization into incarceration.
By virtue of the judge's ruling to commit a patient, his
treatment rights and needs are placed in the hands of the
hospital physicians, subject to periodic administrative (i.e.,
medical) review.9" Competency to refuse treatment does not
survive the commitment decision. That is the law today in a
small number of states." It should be the law in all states.
Today the mental health bar, by inexorably drawing out the
implications of the 1960s reforms so as to wholly vitiate their
intent, has brought the law full circle. Psychiatrist Alan Stone,
comments on this reductio ad absurdum: "A legal system that
orders people into mental hospitals and then orders psychiatrists not to treat them seems to make Kafka's vision of the law
a reality.""5 Equally, it is a perversion of the reason of the law
to draw out its logic to where a concept of competency, designed
to free patients to seek treatment, is turned against them, to
inhibit, if not prohibit this goal.
If we want, as the news media keep urging, to "reclaim our
streets," and more important, to reclaim the lives of the mental-

9 Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
96 The right to periodic administrative review is an important one for all
patients, whether involuntary or voluntary. It ought to be provided by a board
whose membership guarantees an adequate measure of independentjudgment,
an existing practice in many institutions, to be made mandatory where it is
not. This should suffice to monitor the patient's continuing treatment needs
and keep the treating physicians on their toes alter the entry period.
The right to a final, judicial review remains of course intact. But it
should be available only after all administrative options for resolving the
treatment conflict have been exhausted. Even then the case should be
reviewed under the doctrine of the right to (proper) treatment, as opposed to
the contextually inapposite right to refuse.
" In Utah, only the patient who the court finds "lack[s] the ability to
engage in a rational decisionmaking process regarding the acceptance of
mental treatment" can be involuntarily committed. UTAH CODE ANN § 62
A-12-234(c) (Supp.1992). Several other states have similar language in their
commitment statutes, but not necessarily as the sole criterion for involuntary
hospitalization. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(1) (1983); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229.1(14) (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(e), (h)
(Supp.1989); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 330.1401(c) (1991) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.800(401)(c) (Callaghan 1989)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (1991).
" Alan Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 358 (1981).
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ly ill, it is time to return to first principles 99
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and common

sense.

It is our view that the law, by virtue of its roots in adversarial process
generally, and in particular its proclivity to depict the psychiatrist-doctor as
the patient's enemy, grossly shortshrifts common interests between server and
served. In doing so, the law frequently defies common sense. This is not just
the doctor's complaint. It is shared by patient's families as well as by many
lay observers knowledgeable of the law's "finer" points.

